Therefore, in this parliamentary election, New Komeito's position on the constitutional amendment is not only acquiescence and refusal to cooperate, but also explicit opposition. As a result, Abe was forced to revise the Constitution to an additional goal, that is, only writing the Self-Defense Forces into the Constitution. The New Komeito party responded that the existence of the Self-Defense Forces has been recognized by the Japanese people, and there is no need to add the text. In contrast, the New Komeito party also left room for compromise on Abe's revised plan. Strategically speaking, New Komeito hopes to launch proper dialogue on the issue of constitutional amendment in the National Assembly review session through delaying tactics, and opposes forced constitutional amendment, especially when the conditions are not yet ripe, to impose the amendment on one's will. With time not on Mr Abe's side, further joustering between him and New Komeito seems set to intensify.
In addition to using the influence of senior party members such as Toshihiro Nikai, Hiroyuki Hosoda, Fumio Kishida and Tsutomu Sato, Abe also asked the two leaders to jointly issue a notice on October 25. This required every Lib Dem MP to lecture their constituency on constitutional amendments by holding "constitutional seminars" and various forms of "constitutional research". It was also forced to submit a report to the LDP's Constitutional Advancement Department within a week of the events. Abe's aim is to change the attitude of LDP cadres and party members who have expressed reservations about revising the constitution. At the same time, such efforts have been made from within the Party to the general public in order to prepare, under the national consensus, for future plebiscites.
In fact, the failure of the Constitutional Procedure Bill to pass before the current parliamentary recess is a blow to the LDP. As a result, polls speculate that Abe could call a general election before the end of the Tokyo Olympics in 2020, which would provide an opportunity to amend the constitution. At the same time, the possibility that Mr Abe could run for a fourth term as LDP president, thereby extending his term and making way for constitutional change, cannot be completely ruled out. An early dissolution of the House of Representatives for a general election must be justified. Fumiki Iai, a former LDP speaker, said it would be "unconstitutional" to dissolve the lower house for the purpose of amending the constitution. Because "the right to discuss constitutional amendments belongs to the National Assembly, the right to dismiss constitutional amendments belongs to the Cabinet, and it is forbidden to exercise powers outside its functions and powers." So it may not work. Moreover, by November 2019, Abe had become the longest-serving prime minister in Japan's constitutional history and had revisited the party constitution to extend his term. If there is a fourth run, there will undoubtedly be considerable resistance within the party.
As for the future trend of constitutional amendment, it is widely believed in Japan that the Constitutional Amendment Procedure Law is expected to be passed before the end of the Abe administration in September 2021. However, in the draft amendment, opposition parties such as the CDP, the Communist Party and the DPFP have all made it clear that they oppose the four articles proposed by the LDP that are the basis of the draft amendment. Moreover, New Komeito's attitude as a governing partner remains unclear. Even within the LDP, senior figures such as Shigeru Ishiba and Makoto Koga are explicitly opposed to including the SDF in the constitution. At this point, Mr Abe's attempt to steer the path of constitutional change looks very bumpy. In his first term as prime minister, Mr Abe pushed hard to pass a referendum law. Since returning to power in 2012, all his attempts to amend the constitution have stalled. In addition to the Japanese people's deep-rooted belief in pacifism and the resistance of the opposition and New Komeito parties in the ruling coalition, the constitutional amendment should not be determined only by the number of parliamentators, nor should it be a simplified division of political views between the ruling party and the opposition party in the general sense. There should be extensive and in-depth discussion of procedures, proposals, articles, polls, referendums, etc. In particular, the views of experts and practitioners must be heard. An amendment to the Constitution should It is a direction of the country's political reform. Abe has vowed to complete the constitutional amendment during his term. Such individual careerism will only become grounds for criticism and deviate from the spirit of constitutional government. Moreover, the reinterpretation of constitutional amendments, including the right to lift the ban on collective self-defense related to the Security Act, not only weakens the Constitution, but also helps promote the view that "even if it is not a constitutional amendment, it meets the needs of The Times." In this regard, Mr Abe's Liberal Democratic Party has not launched a constructive campaign for constitutional change.
Faced with a huge transformation not seen like it in postwar Japan for more than 70 years, or 150 years since the Meiji Restoration, the issue of constitutional amendments is undoubtedly an important indicator in Japan's direction and whether it will continue to adhere to the path of peaceful development. The setbacks experienced by Japanese right-wing forces in the process of constitutional revision do reflect the deep-rooted pacifist ideology of Japanese society whose bottom line is to defend. The painful lessons of history are still fresh in our minds. As a result, Abe is unlikely to complete his "historic mission" of amending the pacifist constitution during his term in office. Sino-Japanese relations have gone through twists and turns, but have now returned to the right track. In order to achieve a stable and forward-looking bilateral relationship, the two countries must agree on important issues.
(Editing by Li Xin)
(Hu Lingyuan, director of the Center for Japanese Studies at Fudan University.)